dh-term-paper
“You Really Gotta Beat These Bitches Up If You Want to Keep Them Sane” - Gangnam Station Femicide and the Rise of Organized South Korean Manosphere
Introduction - “Let us Be Born as Men Together in Next Life”: A Miscarriage of Justice in Gangnam Station Murder Case
In the early morning of May 17, 2016, a 34-years-old man entered a public bathroom outside of a booth karaoke establishment near the subway station at Gangnam, an upper-middle-class neighborhood in Seoul. There, he waited for a woman to enter the bathroom, and stabbed her with a kitchen knife that he acquired from his job as a restaurant worker, killing the victim, whose name remains anonymous (Seoul Seocho Police Station 2016). While the perpetrator himself has admitted that he’d been looking for a female victim and he did not attack the 6 other men that entered the bathroom before the victim, the narrative quickly changed to be that of a mentally ill person’s motiveless crime, especially as the court psychologist has determined that the man’s delusions were results of his scizophrenia (Seong 2016).
This prompted a truly unprecedented wave of protests by feminists in South Korea, wherein women started protesting the structural inequalities they suffered, both in online and offline spaces (Kim 2016; Park 2016). These protests carried placards that carried harrowing statistics, such as the fact that women made up 84% of victim of violent crimes, while erecting a memorial for the victim at an entrance to the subway station near where the victim had been murdered. In online spaces, women started speaking up on their own experiences with both physical and sexual abuses they suffered under South Korean society, prompting responses from increasingly reactionary South Korean online manosphere. This came to head in multiple counterprotests, which ended with feminists and antifeminists both retreating to an ever more radicalizing spaces, both online and offlines, separated from each other.
During the fallout of this murder case, especially in the early days of the protests, the South Korean media, especially the increasingly-online newspaper and other print media, played a big role in amplifying the voices on both sides, especially in positioning the voices of the misogynist men as “reasonable.” This site, the result of my research into the South Korean online print media’s involvement as well as the activities on the South Korean far-right forums, aims to show that whether on purpose or otherwise, the print media acted irresponsibly and legitimized the South Korean far-right’s hate speech. This resulted in the radicalization of South Korean young men, who felt that their “reasonable” positions were under attack, with many retreating deeper into their far-right spaces, both online and offline.
Militarized Masculinity of South Korean Men
To understand the South Korean men’s reaction to this feminist, one must understand the conscription system in South Korea. All those born in South Korea who are assigned male at birth must serve in the military conscription system, provided that they are judged as able-bodied and mentally fit for service. The men serve for up to two years, often away from urban centers in remote bases. The justification for this sysetem is, of course, the still technically-ongoing conflict against the Socialist state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that South Korea has still not technically ended. Through this system, the masculinization of South Korean men works in a societal, systematic way: The men are expected to serve in the military in order to become a “full citizen,” while those who did not serve suffer under a stratum of citizenship that is, practically and legally, disadvantage. Indeed, feminist scholars in South Korea have long critiqued this relationship, as, “the relationship between citizenship and conscription is that male conscription symbolizes achieving citizenship and true membership in a nation-state, which guarantees equal rights for conscripted men” (Kwon 2000, 40). This is especially evident in the preferential treatment that men used to enjoy in public employment tests for both government and public corporations, ensuring that men enjoyed a greater placement in jobs that had higher wages with less risks (34). This was a perk that Korean men enjoyed for nearly 40 years before the supreme court decided that such practice was unconstitutional in 1999, which invited the ire of young men in Korea. In fact, at the time, young men united across class lines, as “It seemed not to matter whether the men responding had any relationship to the exams or not. Post-conscripts, conscripts, and pre-conscripts altogether raised one angry voice, emphasizing their sacrifices for nation” (35). Here, the crux of the issue is revealed: the men expect to have an elevated place in society for their place in the military, which is reflected in how they view and treat those who cannot or do not serve.
Indeed, the process of masculinization through the military in South Korea is inherently exclusionary, wherein:
This point is highlighted by the formal categories for exemption from military service – the less educated, the indigent, criminals, the disabled, the mentally retarded or ill, the physically unfit, the illegitimate, and women. The duty to defend the nation is simultaneously a masculine right to kill and to be killed. Not only is men’s citizenship fundamentally different than women’s but also it is considered true citizenship (S. Moon 1999).
In South Korea, the Military conscription is most usefully understood as a social process that can be divided into three sub-processes: (1) pre-conscription socialization; (2) military service; and (3) post-conscription interpretation of that military experience” (Kwon 2000, 42). Throughout these processes, before, during and after, the differences between the conscripts and those who do not serve are accentuated, creating a view of masculinity that one must “earn” by going through the institution of conscription, wherein women are not allowed. It is in this atmosphere that South Korean men found themselves, from their point of view, under siege by feminists who sought to blame not just one lone man, but all men for their supposed crimes against women.
Further, the military demands intense and rigid conformity to heterosexuality, wherein “LGBTI people are deemed particularly unsuitable for the military system. In fact, the military criminal law is the one and only place where homosexuality is explicitly mentioned and criminalized in South Korea” (Na et al. 2014, 365). An institution where men are expected to conform to heterosexuality, but nevertheless kept in a total institution by themselves, creates an environment where women, the only acceptable objects of desire, are increasingly objectified, an attitude that is carried with the Korean men outside of the military, especially as they reinforce their masculinity by bonding over their experience in this intensely heterosexual, yet male-exclusive space they occupied for 2 years of their lives.
Ilbe and Organization of Antifeminist Men Online
Ilbe Storehouse, more commonly referred to as Ilbe, is the primary website where these men gathered, and it is important to discuss the backgroudn of the site. Ilbe, a name deriving from Korean portmantu of “Daily,” and “Best,” was created as an offshoot of DC Inside, a long-standing South Korean internet forum. DC Inside was formed initially as a forum for digital camera enthusiasts (hence the DC in its name), but ballooned into other topics with their own subforums, especially as other tech-savvy men flocked to partake the male-dominated forum’s culture (Jeong 2007). Ilbe started off as a sort of an aggregate and a highlight site for the best posts on DC Inside, where the most discussed or voted best posts, often far-right in nature, gathered onto the forum, with their own discussion soon exploding the forum’s popularity (Jeong 2013). Here, the most far-right of DC Inside’s users gathered, creating an atmosphere of radicalization that led to the organized challenge against the feminist protests in Gangnam.
This far-right atmosphere came to head during the aftermath of the Gangnam Station femicide, where the men from Ilbe erected a memorial for the conscripted sailors on ROKS Cheonam next to the memorial for the femicide’s victim, claiming that the men have “been killed because they were men,” as the memorial wreath’s ribbon read, before an enraged citizen ripped the ribbon off the wreath (Park 2016). Organized on Ilbe, this stunt was met with divisive attention even on Ilbe, with some members expressing that, “the heroes on ROKS Cheonam must be watching over up, and you’re cheapening their name and tarnishing their honor” (“That Being Said” 2016). Even so, the fact that the users on Ilbe has organized this is beyond the reasonable doubt, both in terms of reporting and from the forum posts themselves. This incident shows that just like the feminists, who’d been organized and loud about their grievances, the misogynist men on Ilbe felt that they, too, must organize, and have chosen to do so in the open. In fact, the users responsible even took credit for the wreath with their username on the wreath (Park 2016). The fact that the men were not only organizing, but also that they chose a military victim of violence (as unique victim of male-targeted violence) shows the collision of the connected nature of South Korean people, where the internet has allowed for a country-wide connect of young men, and the conscription masculinity, where those who participated in the conscription remains the primary ingroup for young men, with the suffering and abuses of the institution serving as the connecting tissues for their social interactions. The growth was not unremarkable either, “Ilbe ranked first among humor sites and was Korea’s third largest online community as of october 2016,” having grown significantly due to this incident (Kim 2018 151). The conscript masculinity plays into radicalizing speciifcally men, as the men, like with the military, once again find a common enemy that they must fight. This is especially true in context of South Korean men that perceive women as “exploiting” them, economically and more importantly, in context of the military service, where the men feel that their service to the country is met with ungrateful women (164). This led to “Ilbe users try[ing] to initiate and prolong ‘wars’ against women to reaffirm their masculine identities and boundaries” (165). Using the language and logic of militancy, originally employed against communists that the men are indoctrinated against in the military, South Korean misogynist men partook in yet another crusade to save the South Korean society, this time, against half of South Korea’s populace.
Information Laundering
The process in which the South Korean print media, especially in online spaces, found themselves legitimizing and amplifying the misogynist far-right voices is also well-discussed in the space of United States and the popular discourse surrounding marginalized people, as well. In a process called “information laundering,” the ways in which the media reports on the arguments from far-right websites like Ilbe in South Korea, especially in legitimizing their arguments by treating them as equally valid as feminists, has an effect of redirecting the readers to the far-right sites, wherein an eager crowd partakes in their radicalization. Indeed, “In cyberspace, the pathways to false knowledge and propaganda are the same as those that lead to legitimate and credible resources. It is as if beneficiaries like the White Power movement have slid into a new Dewey Decimal System and contaminated it, but few have noticed their presence there” (Klein 2012, 435). Similar to the white power movement, as will be discussed below, the denizens of Ilbe often revel at the idea that their idea has gone mainstream, and also offers others to join them in their bigotries. Consciously or not, the South Korean news media participated in laundering the information for the most virulent South Korean misogynists that hide behind their anonymity, framing it as just platforming both sides of the argument, and this led to an explosion of recruitment for Ilbe’s misogynist crusade against feminists.
Methodology and Broader Themes
To state the obviously, in order to analyze the ways in which the reactionary right positions made their way into the media, one must find the reactionary right positions first. Luckily, as discussed above, the South Korean far right is not shy about letting the general public know where on the internet they get their ideas. While all it would take was visiting Ilbe Storehouse and searching for 강남역 [Gangnam Station], this returned a staggering ten thousand posts on the topic. Even discounting the posts that were made far after the incident talking about the location, within the first two weeks of intense protests, there were 6850 posts made by the users of Ilbe, with over 18000 words posted in all of their posts. In order to merely collect this data would normally take hours of manhours, so using python and employing the help of a programmer who wishes to only be credited by his username of yakuman, we programmed a text scraper that scraped the text of all the posts from May 17th, 2016 to May 31st, 2016. This was the two-week period between the murder and the most intense parts of the protests (May 18th-23rd), as well as some time after to properly record the aftermath. While I found the initial code, it was unable to properly scrape the nested urls, so major parts had to be rewritten by yakuman. A link to the csv file of all the text is provided in this hyperlink, and the python code are provided below.
[from typing import Any # by yakuman
import scrapy
from scrapy.http import Response
from ..items import KaguyaItem
import re # imported for the remove_html_tags function on line 149
# This bot is written solely for scraping ilbe.com , whose search function outputs 10 results per page.
# Code modification would be required to support other websites.
# Initialize your scraping here ================================================== #
#
# Example: if you want to search pages 100 thru 115 of '강남역',
# you would set
# initial_index = 100
# last_index = 116 <= note how this 115+1!!!
# url_d = 강남역
initial_index = 415
last_index = 1000 # once again, don't forget the last page checked is this value MINUS 1
url_a = 'https://www.ilbe.com' # do not touch
url_b = '/search?docType=doc&searchType=title_content&page=' # do not touch
url_c = str(initial_index) # do not touch
url_d = '&q=' # do not touch
search_query = '강남역' # you may touch
# Global variables that will be modified during execution ======================== #
index = initial_index # this value will increment during url collection
link_list = list() # stores urls
content_list = list() # stores content from web pages
phase_2 = False # boolean to denote transition from url collection to content collection
view_index = 0 # this value will increment during content collection
items = KaguyaItem() # data's final resting place
# This is a class. Hope this helps.
class FlamenSpider(scrapy.Spider):
# Declaring global values in the class so they can be used =================== #
global url_a
global url_b
global url_c
global url_d
global search_query
# Name of the spider ========================================================= #
# In order to run it from the command line,
# go to kaguya-scraper\kaguyascraper and write:
# scrapy crawl [name]
# If you want to write the output to a file, write:
# scrapy crawl [name] -o [filename].csv
# There are other file extensions but just ask if need be.
name = 'flamenco'
# Starting point ============================================================= #
# This is the first url the bot opens. If you've read up to this point you should know what link this string concatenation will form.
start_urls = [
url_a + url_b + url_c + url_d + search_query
]
# This is the main function ================================================== #
# HIGH-LEVEL EXPLANATION OF BOT LOGIC HERE
# It's split into three steps that are enabled by ilbe.com's consistent structure, as mentioned previously
# A search query outputs up to 1000 pages, each with 10 results.
#
# Step 1: the bot scrapes every search result page for 10 urls leading to posts
# Step 2: the bot scrapes each individual url for its content
# Step 3: the bot places the output from each step in alternating order, such that the output would look something like this:
#
# [link 1] , [content of link 1] , [link 2] , [content of link 2] , [link 3] , [content of link 3]
# Notes about output:
# - commas are all deleted from content posts, such that commas delimit the boundary between content blocks and urls.
# - certain posts on ilbe.com are members only, therefore the content for those posts will simply be '#####'
def parse(self, response):
# Declaring global values in the function so they can be used ============ #
#
global initial_index
global index
global last_index
global link_list
global content_list
global phase_2
global view_index
global items
# Content collection ===================================================== #
#
if phase_2 == True: #
content = response.css(".post-content").extract() # extracting raw html
if len(content) == 0 : # if no content was extracted, that means it was probably a members' only page
content = ['#####'] # therefore content would be null, so we write '#####' to it
content_list.extend(content) # note: 'ROBOTSTXT_OBEY' in settings.py has to be set to false to avoid runtime errors
view_index = view_index + 1 # once you're in the content collection phase, after this line,
# you go straight to line 125
# URL collection ========================================================= #
#
if index < last_index : # this iterates thru search result pages,
# meaning that once you've gone thru all the pages and gotten all your urls
# this entire if block is skipped, go straight to the else, line 125
link = response.css("li").xpath('//a[contains(@href, "/view/")]/@href').extract() # a. manual inspection of search result pages
# shows that the 10 results' urls start with /view/
link = list(dict.fromkeys(link)) # b. this line deletes all duplicates from the list
del link[-1] # c. at the bottom of every page on ilbe, manual inspection
del link[-1] # showed there were two additional links starting with /view/
# therefore manually deleting the last two links in the list
# at every iteration fixes this issue
# THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS THIS BOT IS SPECIFICALLY TAILORED TO
# ILBE.COM'S SEARCH RESULTS
link_list.extend(link)
# Having collected the urls from one search result page, we now go to the next.
index = index + 1 # a. incrementing the index
next_page = url_a + url_b + str(index) + url_d + search_query # b. updating the next url to check
if index <= last_index : # c. check to avoid leaving the desired page range
yield response.follow(next_page, callback = self.parse) # instruction that tells the bot to open the next page,
# then go back to the start of the parse function, line 76
# Content collection initialization/going to the next link ================ #
#
else : # once url collection is complete, this else block initiates the
phase_2 = True # content collection by flipping the phase_2 boolean and making the bot
if view_index <= ((last_index - initial_index) * 10 -1): # iterate through the url list in the content collection block at line 89
yield response.follow("https://www.ilbe.com" + link_list[view_index], callback = self.parse)
# Organizing data for storage ============================================ #
# This block gets entered once everything has been scraped and stored in link_list and content_list.
#
else :
output = list() # initializing final storage list
for x in range(len(content_list)):
html_cleaned = self.remove_html_tags(content_list[x]) # a. wiping html tags from a piece of content for legibility
all_clean = html_cleaned.replace(",","") # b. cleaning commas from content so content and links are clearly delineated
all_clean = html_cleaned.replace("\n","") # c. cleaning newlines and tabs
all_clean = html_cleaned.replace("\t","")
output.append('\n'+link_list[x]) # d. appending links and content in alternating order
output.append(all_clean) # note: I also added a newline before every url which makes things more legible
items['output'] = output # how scrapy likes to output stuff.
yield items
def remove_html_tags(self, text): # didn't write this function; Source:
clean = re.compile('<.*?>') # https://medium.com/@jorlugaqui/how-to-strip-html-tags-from-a-string-in-python-7cb81a2bbf44
return re.sub(clean, '', text)]
The data, fortunately, required very little sorting after the scraping, as the search results of the archive is automatically sorted from the most recent to the oldest, meaning that the data scraped can be read in reverse-chronological order with no question on which post is more recent than the other. While the exact date was not scraped, the scraper did preserve the URL, and the posts themselves still contain the exact time that the post was made.
In addition, this research utilized a very low-level “text analysis,” in that instances hate word and other keywords were searched via the code editor’s search tool, locating both the time period wherein the words were used intensely and the frequency of the word’s usage. This allowed me to quickly cross-reference the posts’ general trends and the times in which they were posted with the South Korean online prints’ articles, tracking which argument from the Korean reactionary right trickled into the media, and vice versa.
Further, I’ve provided an archive of every post from Ilbe and news article quoted/cited, archived via connifer in the form of .warc files in the hyperlinks in this sentence.
Statistics/Distant Reading
The occurrence of the keywords provided a valuable insight into the reaction of the South Korean misogynist right. The frequency, provided in the table below, shows the priority of South Korean men, especially in what they saw as one of the major crises of their masculinity.
| Word | Occurence |
|---|---|
| Misandry [남혐] | 393 |
| Lone [하나] | 548 |
| Mentally Ill [정신] | 654 |
| Kimchi [김치] | 190 |
| Maegal [메갈] | 1276 |
| Cunt [보지] | 432 |
| Commie [빨] | 856 |
| Military [군대] | 110 |
| ROKS Cheonam [천암] | 30 |
Sorted in order of presentation below, the idea that the feminists were misandrists, the idea that there was just a lone, mentally-ill person, often dominated the first week of discussion, especially as the police released its psychological assessment of the killer. Altogether, these excuses were brought up 1595 times, showing that while, individually, these excuses did not make up the most talked about, combined, they still measure up to other terms.
Meanwhile, as the woman’s protests started, the language shifted to be more on the offensive against these women, as Kimchi, a derogatory way of referring to Korean women (often as Kimchi-nyeon or Kimchi-nyeo, literally meaning Kimchi Woman), started cropping up in the discussion, and while Maegal, a shorthand for Maegalia, a South Korean feminist collective, had always been ambiently there, the mentions of them truly exploded around the protests, with the the mentions going from once every few posts to multiple posts in a row talking about the group. Altogether, the denigration of women was brought up 1898 times, making it, by far, the most populace topic of discourse around this topic.
Another important point is that “commie” is the secondmost used term, even beyond “mentally ill,” the third most used term. Here, we see the reification of, and reinforcement of, the South Korean military conscription system. The progressives are Progress Commies (보빨), Feminists are Megalian Commies (메빨), and these sort of rhetorics continue. This, of course, did not get reflected in the news, as this was for reinforcing the belief of those who came to Ilbe from reading the news (and thus stayed internally, rather than as a part of any public-facing counter-protest), but while the military and ROKS Cheonam were barely mentioned, the tactics used in the conscription were still used to shore up the men’s solidarity. While the militarized way of talking only makes up 996 posts, and indeed, these talks, by far, only come later in the discussions, the sheer volume of just redbaiting is enough to mention this fact, especially in light of why the accusations of the opposition being communists was employed.
While these are broader trends, it’s important to do a bit of close reading, and how this reflects the trends from South Korean news media.
“Not all Men”
The most prevailing story that had the most purchase throughout the entire incident and the protests was, of course, that this was a lone, mentally ill man’s work. This was a sense of tremendous grievance for many people of Ilbe, wherein they complained that “Even though the police declared this to be a result of one person’s delusions, we are left to take the blame as a group” (“What’s the Meaning”). Some users have even written an open letter to the reporters who focused on the misogyny aspect, asking if “they’d call for the genocide of black people, since they commit the most violent crime in the United States” (“To SBS’ Documentary” 2016). Chosun Ilbo, the most conservative outlet, was one of the first to break the story about the mental illness as the cause for the crime, which, given the conservative userbase of Ilbe, is not stretch that the talking points such as uncritically quoting the police report that “There are too many opinions that are not substantiated from the public” (Yang 2016). The South Korean press continued to debate the nature of this, often giving some credence to the idea that mental illness was the motivation, as the police says. For instance, even an article covering the women’s horror at the abjecct horror reminded the readers that “the suspect was undergoing treatment for scizophrenia,” as well (Koo 2016).
With this, came the deflection towards misandry. For instance, one user asked why “there was no focus on women’s motiveless misandry” (“Gangnaam Station was” 2016). With these grievances, the users of Ilbe started constructing their own narratives, one that they would go on to push upon the public.
“Women are the Enemies”
The idea that women are blowing this incident out of proportion caught on early on in the protests by the men of Ilbe. For instance, on May 20th, there was already a post that accused feminists of “fermenting hate between men and women,” because “these ugly feminists can’t get men anyway” (“What Maegals Want” 2016). While there was a newspapers that did position the debate as being between women and men, this was the most conservative mainstream newspaper in South Korea, with no other reporting similarly until the men of Ilbe started bringing this accusation forth in public spaces (Choi 2016). Here, there was the familiar excuse of the fact that “taking the actions of a scizophrenic man to be equal to generalized misogyny is too far,” but there is also the idea that women are being too harsh towards men, as, “it could have just as easily been a child or an elderly person, but no one would call that a hate crime based on ageism” (Kim 2016).
Another outlet, also reporting on May 19th, did take a more moderate route, stating that, “this is a matter of generalized anxieties of those who occupy a weaker space in South Korea’s society,” without necessarily blaming the women for any conflict (Shin 2016). Yet, after spates of posts like the one made by the anonymous Ilbe poster, the media started fixating on another angle. For instance, Money Today, the same newspaper outlet, used an explicitly confrontational language, calling the increased tension at the protests, “Battle of ‘Soybean Woman vs Verminous Korean Men’,” using the purposefully inflammtory language to frame the matter, where both sides are equally at fault. Similarly, the reporting that called out the tendency of men to react badly to the highlighting of misogyny has changed to the fact that Ilbe users have asked if “All men are murderers” (“Soybean Paste Woman” 2016, Kim 2016). All of this culminated in explicit accusation in the mainstream press towards feminists of “dividing the nation,” urging their protests to stop (Choi 2016). This sort of reporting, one that accuses the feminists of “derailing” the cause, misses the point that it was the male counter-protests that have been the hostile party, in an attempt to drive these women from their expression of sorrow and anger.
The language of conflict has been present in Ilbe’s posting as well, where the users were wishing “those at the frontline,” the “best of lucks,” as if the misogynist antiprotesters were going into battle on their behalf (“If anyone is” 2016). Meanwhile, lurid tales of “combat” soon reached feverish engagement by those that did not show up to the counterprotests, with others egging the author on to further escalate the conflict in the comments (“I was One” 2016). Here, we see that, legitimitized by the mainstream news, the members of Ilbe, too, start looking to further ratchet up the tension.
“Unite, the Men of South Korea!”
This third response largely makes up the reinforcement of the conscription masculinity to ensure that those who showed up to Ilbe to discuss the matter stays in Ilbe. This includes the idea that South Korean women are ungrateful, especially for their military service, and how this makes them communists or communist allies.
Here, there is a disproportionate media response. For instance, the counter-memorial victims of the sinking of ROKS, a South Korean naval ship, was organized, but the discussion had died down after. Even so, this was widely reported by the South Korean news media, with agencies directly mentioning Ilbe on the article’s title (Park 2016; Kim 2016). Meanwhile, the much more violent, hateful rhetoric that came after was ignored, as protests and the in-person conflict largely died down. This led to another big trend: redbaiting the protestors.
During the last days of the protests (as well as in the aftermath), the rhetoric increasingly became militant, and appeals to greater societal values became more prevalent. For instance, on May 23rd, as the last day of the protests, one of the many anonymous posters have declared that, “While the man-hating commie pigs all disappeared… Us at Ilbe really are the most fit in this free, democratic society” (“The Memorial Site” 2016). Meanwhile, on the 24th, immediately after the protests, the militancy only ramped up. Proudly sharing pictures of LGBT+ rights protesters getting brutalized in foreign countries, referring to these stochastic terrorist euphemistically as “physical therapists,” the South Korean men called for the same to happen to South Korean men that supported women, as well as women themselves, as well (“Reasons why South” 2016). Further, posters shared infographics that proudly shared the men’s intention to do violence against women, “in accordance to the women’s beliefs,” touting this infographic as, “the best analysis of the situation” (“I Think This” 2016).
Here, we see the only tool for solidarity that is celebrated for South Korean men, that is, participation in a violent and brutal institution, being used to recruit and radicalize the men, including glorification of those that the men see as lesser than them. This sort of attitude really contributes to the closing-of-ranks for many of these South Korean men, who only see violence as the acceptable way to unite. This is perfectly encapsulated by a South Korean man, who claimed to have been discharged only a few days before the protests, and felt that even though he suffered with only the pride for his nation in his mind, all he felt was despair at the state of the country, and that men, too, must gather en masse in real life (“In 15 Days”). The confluence of the ideas is all there: the men have served the nation, yet they must take the blame for a lone man’s mentally ill episode, so, as women have, men must gather! It is the perfect summation of the self-victimizing mindset that South Korean misogynists have fallen into, one that can only justify solidarity with themselves.
Conclusion - Another Dangerous Evening as a Woman in South Korea
On November 4th, 2023, in the city of Jinju in South Gyeongsang province, an inebriated man (who remains anonymous, alongside his victims), who had ranted that “feminists are ruining the world,” entered a convenience store, and started trashing the merchandise (Witch D 2024). Witch D, an activist for abolition of violence against women writing the account anonymously, continues the accounting of the incident as follows. When the convenience store employee, a woman with a short haircut, tried to intervene, the woman, on the basis of her haircut, was called “a feminist,” who, therefore, was, “someone that deserves to be hit,” ensuing a violent beatdown that culminated with the employee’s phone being throw into a running microwave in order to stop her from calling the police. It was only when a man intervened on behalf of the employee that the beatdown stopped, with the man identifying himself as, “Junior Vice Representative of Men’s Solidarity League” when he was finally arrested. While, unlike the Gangnam Femicide, the police have immediately ruled this incident as a hate crime this time, the court has overturned this decision, calling the perpetrator mentally unfit on the basis of his misogynistic delusions. Thus, crime was seen as a result of his mental illness, reducing the man’s sentence.
It must be noted that the perpetrator’s misogyny was used as a basis for his unsound mind during the trial, and in doing so, the court has essentially allowed hate to be used as a basis for exoneration. This creates a legal precedence where hate itself is grounds for lenient treatment, a legal framework where men can get away with hitting women because misogyny, while systematically enforced, is considered abnormal in the South Korean society. It has been 8 years since the femicide at the bathroom in Gangnam has been ruled as a crime of mental illness, but it seems that the South Korean society has learned nothing about the deep-seated misogyny in the male solidarity spaces, aside from the perpetrators who used the incident to start organizing themselves in the same way as feminists. It is no longer a lone man with a knife; it is a representative of a group that organizes for “men’s solidarity,” who feels that men are entitled to physically abuse women they find objectionable. The militarized masculinity that defines being a man in South Korea breeds, time and time again, this mentality of Korean men they “deserve” a place of supremacy in the South Korean society over those who do not enter conscription, and that those who did go through the conscription program with them do not deserve solidarity. To tackle the problem of misogyny in the South Korean society, it’s important to not only empower the women to speak up, but to dismantle the virulent breeding ground of male supremacy that engenders the kind of hatred towards those that men see as lesser. Without a serious conversation about the only solidarity that men deserve as aggressive and militant against a vaguely defined enemy, the South Korean men will always see those that exist outside of their insular community as the new proxy for their aggression.
Works Cited
Central News. “‘된장녀’, ‘김치녀’ 등 여성 비하 봇물…男 역차별 의식이 ‘강남역 살인’ 불렀다 [Soybean Paste Woman, Kimchi Woman, and Other Misogynistic Slurs… Men’s Idea of Reverse Sexism Created the Gangnam Station Killer].” May 19, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.joongboo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1074043.
Chase, Thomas. “Problems of Publicity: Online Activism and Discussion of Same-Sex Sexuality in South Korea and China.” Asian Studies Review 36, no. 2 (2012): 151–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2012.685450.
Choi, Wonwoo. “‘여자라서 죽었다’ vs ‘정신 이상자의 개인 범행일뿐’ 강남역 묻지마 살인 사건, 여성 혐오 논란으로 비화 [“She was Kill because she’s a Woman” vs ‘It’s a Lone Man’s Crazy Action’ Gangnam Station Motiveless Killing, Complicated Story due to Debate Over Misogyny].” Chosun Ilbo, July 23, 2020, sec. 사회. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/19/2016051901826.html.
Choi, Yuhee. “기자수첩 남녀간 성대결로 변질된 ‘강남역 사건’, 편가르기 멈춰야 [Reporter’s Opinion: Gangnam Station Incident Derailed Due to Battle of the Genders: We Must Not Divide Each Other Over Genders].” News Post, May 23, 2016, sec. 오피니언. https://www.newspost.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=47904.
Ilbe Storehouse. “강남역 10번 출구 ‘화장실 살인’ 추모공간 철거 ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ [The Memorial Site at 10th Exit at Gangnam Station got Demolished lol],” May 22, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8102806851.
Ilbe Storehouse. “강남역 사건을 머구에서도 추모한다는건 뭘 뜻할까? [What’s the Meaning of the Gangnam Station Memorial in Daegu?],” May 20, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8085559313.
Ilbe Storehouse. “강남역 실시간 궁금한 사람 이사람 생방봐라.facebook [If Anyone is Curious About what is Happening in Gangnam, Just Tune Into This Stream.facebook],” May 22, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8097761743.
Ilbe Storehouse. “강남역에서 커피게이 바로 옆에 있었던 게이다 팩트 정리해준다.txt [I was One of the Guys that was There Next to the Guy Who Got Coffee Dumped on Him. This is what Actually Happened.],” May 23, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8100943719.
Ilbe Storehouse. “그래서 [That Being Said],” May 21, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com.
Ilbe Storehouse. “뉴스에서도 강남역 사건 나오더라 [Gangnam Station was on the News too],” May 21, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8086946933.
Ilbe Storehouse. “메갈이 원하는건 남녀평등이 아니라, 남녀갈등이다. [What Maegals Want Isn’t Equality, but Division, Between Men and Women.],” May 20, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8085328547.
Ilbe Storehouse. “보름뒤 현충의날 남자들도 모이자. [In 15 Days, Let’s All Men Gather on Memorial Day, too.],” May 22, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8093419487.
Ilbe Storehouse. “스브스 그알 피디야 [To SBS’ Documentary Director],” May 21, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8086932237.
Ilbe Storehouse. “오늘 강남역에 암베도잇엇냐?ㅋㅋㅋㅋ [Any Woman from Ilbe at Gangnam Station Today? lol],” May 23, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8099801800.
Ilbe Storehouse. “이번 강남역 사태 분석글중 최고수준 [I Think This One is the Best Analysis of the Situation at Gangnam],” May 24, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8109922613.
Ilbe Storehouse. “진짜 나랑 친한 사람만 잘 되면 그만이다 [All I Really Want are For People I Like and No One Else to Do Well],” May 30, 2016. https://www.ilbe.com.
Ilbe Storehouse. “한국에도 물리치료사가 필요한 이유 [Reasons Why South Korea Needs Physical Therapists Too],” 5-24-20156. https://www.ilbe.com/view/8109924022.
Jeong, Yong-in. “인물탐구 김유식 DC인사이드 대표 [Highlight: Kim Yu-Sik, the Administrator for DCInside].” Newsmaker, July 31, 2007. http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&dept=115&art_id=15043.
———. “표지이야기 우파 사이트 ‘일베’ 급성장, 온라인커뮤니티 대전 뜨겁다 [Cover Story: RIght Wing Site ‘Ilbe’ Shows Rapid Expansion, Online Community’s Showdowns Heating Up].” Kyunghyang Weekly, January 22, 2013. http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&dept=113&art_id=201301151338241.
Jin, Eunhye. “10년 곪은 ‘된장녀 vs 한남충’ 갈등…강남역 살인으로 폭발? [Battle of ‘Soybean Woman vs Verminous Korean Men’… Finally Boiling Over due to Gangnam Station After 10 Years of Fermenting?].” Money Today, May 21, 2016, sec. society. https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2016052014263783340.
Kim, Gooyeon. “’강남역’의 마스크 일베 ‘남자가 다 살인자냐’ [Gangnam Station’s Masked Ilbe: ‘Are All Men Murders?’].” NoCut News, May 21, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/4596598.
Kim, Jinsoook. “Misogyny for Male Solidarity: Online Hate Discourse Against Women in South Korea.” In Mediating Misogyny: Gender, Technology, and Harassment, edited by Jacqueline Ryan Vickery and Tracy Everbach, 1st ed., 151–71. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=38cc67f6401ec6ef3e18c092bdc68913.
Kim, Nami. The Gendered Politics of the Korean Protestant Right Hegemonic Masculinity. 1st ed. 2016. Asian Christianity in the Diaspora. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39978-2.
Kim, Seunjong. “강남역 여성 살인 사건 ’남성중심적 시각’이 문제 [Gangnam Station Femicide Case: Viewpoints that Center Men is the Problem.].” OhMy News, May 21, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002211397.
Kim, Yaeji. “강남역 10번 출구에 간 ’일베 화환’의 최후 [The Fate of Ilbe’s Flower Wreath at Gangnam Station’s 10th Exit].” OhMy News, May 20, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002211074.
Klein, Adam. “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream: A Theory of Information Laundering.” Communication Theory 22 (November 1, 2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01415.x.
Koo, Gunhyo. “‘여자를 죽이지 마세요. 그게 어려운 일인가요’ [“Don’t Kill Women. Is that a Hard Ask?”].” News&Joy, May 19, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=203495.
Kwon, Insook. “A Feminist Exploration of Military Conscription: The Gendering of the Connections Between Nationalism, Militarism and Citizenship in South Korea.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 3, no. 1 (2000): 26–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/713767489.
Lee, Minyoung. “강남역 살인 사건 ‘나도 남자가 무서웠다’ 여성들 ‘커밍아웃’… 대화를 던지다 [Gangnam Station Murder Case ‘I’ve Always Been Scared of Men’: Women’s ‘Coming Out’… Conversations are Starting.” 서울신문, May 23, 2016. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/society/2016/05/24/20160524003005.
Moon, Seungsook. “Unraveling Militarism: Gender Equality and a Controversy over Military Service and Employment Benefits.” Boston, 1999.
Na, Tari Young-Jung, Ju Hui Judy Han, and Se-Woong Koo. “The South Korean Gender System: LGBTI in the Contexts of Family, Legal Identity, and the Military.” Journal of Korean Studies (Seattle, Wash. : 1979) 19, no. 2 (2014): 357–77. https://doi.org/10.1353/jks.2014.0018.
Park, Suji. “일베, 강남 추모장소에 ‘천안함 용사 잊지 맙시다’ 근조화환 [Ilbe Erects Memorial Wreath for Victims of ROKS Cheonam Near Memorial for Victim].” Hankyoreh, May 19, 2016, sec. 사회일반. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/744701.html.
Park, Taewoo. “강남 살인사건이 ‘여성혐오 범죄’인 이유 [Why the Gangnam Station Murder is a Hate Crime Against Women].” Hankyoreh, May 19, 2016, sec. 사회일반. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/744707.html.
Park, You-me. “The Crucible of Sexual Violence: Militarized Masculinities and the Abjection of Life in Post-Crisis, Neoliberal South Korea.” Feminist Studies 42, no. 1 (2016): 17–40. https://doi.org/10.15767/feministstudies.42.1.17.
Seong, Sung-eun. “강남 묻지마 살인, 정신질환자 전형적 범죄…’女가 괴롭혀’ 망상(종합) [Gangnam Motiveless Murder, Typical Crime for the Mentally Ill… ‘Women have Tormented Me,’ a Delusion (combined)].” Yonhap News Agency, May 22, 2016, sec. 사회. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20160522012651004.
Seoul Seocho Police Station. “주점 화장실에서 20대 여성 살해한 피의자 검거 [Arrest of the Suspect for the Murder of a Woman in her 20s at a Bathroom near a Bar].” Seoul Seocho Police Station, May 18, 2016. https://www.smpa.go.kr/user/nd35717.do?View&boardNo=00186395.
Shin, Jisoo. “’성 혐오 대결’로 가는 강남역 살인, 문제 풀려면… [“Battle of Sex Discrimination” in Gangnam Station, How to Solve This Issue…].” Money Today, May 19, 2016, sec. society. https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2016051914010534875.
Witch D. “여성혐오는 가해자 ‘선처’의 근거일 수 없다 [Misogyny Should Not Be the Basis for Lenient Treatment for Criminals].” Hankyoreh 21, April 19, 2024. https://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/55397.html.
Yang, Jihae. “경찰-표창원 ‘강남역 묻지마 살인, 여성혐오 범죄로 단정짓기 어렵다’ 한 목소리 [“Gangnam Motiveness Murder, Hard to Say is Result of Misogyny”: Police-Assembyman Cho: United in Assessment.].” Chosun Ilbo, July 23, 2020, sec. 사회. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/19/2016051901748.html.